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ABSTRACT
This report presents aresearch ofa prototype methodology toassess the security of
chemical facilities within the Malaysia. The Vulnerability Assessment (VA) do identifies
andassesses potential security threats, risks, and vulnerabilities and guides the chemical
facility industry in making security improvements. The National Institute of Justice
developed theVulnerability Assessment Methodology (VAM) in collaboration with the
Department ofEnergy's Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia National Laboratories
employees are recognized experts in security andcounterterrorism andhaveextensive
experience inthe protection ofnuclear weapons and radiological materials for the process
plant The objectives of theproject areto study thevulnerability assessment framework
and dothe implementation by doing a case study in PETRONAS operation unit. Inthis
project, theVulnerability Assessment Methodology (VAM) by Sandia National
Laboratories isused asguidance to implement vulnerability assessment in PETRONAS
plantprocess. The challenge in this project is dothecase study in one of theOPU in
which involved collecting theplantdata process.
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1.0 BACKGROUND OF STUDY
Vulnerability assessment (VA) is a mandatory requirement by many countries especially
in United States, after 9/11 tragedy. Vulnerability assessment do identifies and assesses
potential security threats, risks, and vulnerabilities and guides the chemical facility
industry in making security improvements. The use of the vulnerability assessment is
limited to preventing or mitigating terrorist or criminal actions that could have significant
national impact, such as the loss ofchemicals vital to the national defense or economy or
could seriously affect localities, such as the release of hazardous chemicals mat would
compromise the integrity of the facility, contaminate adjoining areas, or injure or kill
facility employees oradjoining populations. It's basically toprevent terrorist or criminals
actions thatcanleave a significant impact onthenations byreducing the risks level from
being attack [3]
Security threats can come from internal or external adversaries. Internal threats include
disgruntled employees and/or contractors, employees forced into cooperation by threat of
extortion or violence. External sources include criminals, extremists or terrorists. The
most important objective of anadversary, next to successfully completing the mission, is
not being detected. Detection usually results in a failed mission. Because the external
adversaries may not need to enter your plant, there are few mitigation options for
increasing the likelihood of detection prior to the attack. Furthermore, as a recent article
"Terrorists focus on simple means (toavoid detection). They aregoing to use stuffthat's
available."[USA Today The Forum States] We need to think like terrorists if we want to
prevent an attack. "We're looking for this big, magical attack, and the terrorists are
looking for stuff that's already in the environment." Some chemical companies have
already decided that protecting their assets from attack by armed combatants with
military caliber weapons is the responsibility ofgovernment and local authorities.!!]
Furthermore, coupled with the terrorist's desire tobeunobtrusive, such a scenario isnota
high priority for prevention. Given that a chemical plant became the target, a more
plausible scenario is the detonation ofanammonium nitrate and distillate fuel oil next to
a storage tank. This only requires stuffthat isalready inthe local environment.!!]
Nowadays, VA is a mandatory requirement for the chemical plants in Europe and
America but not inAsia. In the future, the VA will set the foot in Asia to be implemented
more vigorously[9] For the Oil and Gas industry in Malaysia, it is important to conduct a
study on the risk assessment of vulnerability impacts against the predicted variations
from the national and international models, [Dr. Foo Say Moo, PETRONAS][9]
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The vulnerability assessment is usually used by the European and American companies.
However, it is not yet implemented inAsia, especially Malaysia. As the time goes on, the
vulnerability assessment will be one of the mandatory requirements in the Asian.
PETRONAS, as one ofthe Oil and Gas Company in the world, have been looking to
these issues seriously [9]. The application ofvulnerability assessment in Asian especially
Malaysia will face some difficulties since there are no exact framework to be as example
or guidance. There are three vulnerability assessments available in which the applications
depend on its suitability to the company. Each of the assessments does have the
advantages and disadvantages. Proper research is needed to determine which assessment
suit to PETRONAS. As the pioneer of this assessment, case study is needed to be the
example for the future use.
1.2 OBJECTIVES
The main objectives of this research are:
• To study the vulnerability assessment framework
• To appfy the vulnerability assessment framework by doing a case study in one of
the PETRONAS Operation Unit(OPU)
1.3 SCOPE OF STUDY
• Vulnerability Assessment Method (VAM) by Sandia National Laboratories
Sandia VAM method can be said as the complete set of vulnerability assessment
since it include all the process that are needed in tins project such as site survey
for a case study. There was an attempt to make the Sandia VAM as a regulated
standard for vulnerability assessment but this appears to be less likely due to the
changes in the Congress, Washington Update, Passage of Chemical Security Act
Seems Unlikely, CEP November 2002. The VAM was chose due to it
completeness [R. Peter Stickles et-al][l]
• Considered onlythe worsecase scenario [3]
• Adversarytype ofattack is terroristattack [3]
• Casestudy on Vinyl Chloride Malaysia SdnBhd(VCMSB)
• Has significant impact on the nation [3]
» Has a tool onsiteinventory of threshold quantities (TQ)or greater of chemical
covered underFederal regulation 40 CFR68.130 [3][7]
1.4 THE RELEVANCY AND FEASIBILITY OF THE PROJECT
The wars in die middle-east have increased the possibility ofMalaysia to be attack by the
terrorist- The terrorist might chose the PETRONAS process plant as a target to break
down the economic since PETRONAS is the major economic contributor to the
Malaysia. As the economic sector collapse, other foreign country will use this
opportunity to get involve with Malaysia, hence controlling the country. Vulnerability





The use ofvulnerability assessment (VA) is to prevent or mitigate the terrorist or criminal
action that could have a significant impact on the nation, such as the lose of chemicals
vital to the national defense or economy, or seriously effect the localities. Basically there
are three methods to start the vulnerability assessment which are:
1. Vulnerability Assessment Methodology (VAM)
2. American Chemical Council (ACC)
3. Chemical Engineers Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS).
The U.S. Department ofJustice, Office ofJustice Programs has already supported the
development ofthe Chemical Facility. Vulnerability Assessment Methodology (VAM),
which was prepared by Sandia National Laboratories, Chemical industry groups
including the American Chemical Council (ACC) and The American Institute of
Chemical Engineers Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) have also responded
with their own guidelines and methodologies for assessing treats of attack from internal























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.0(a) does differentiate the three public domain method to do VA. AH the three
methods can be applied in all countries such as Malaysia. ACC SSG method is the
simplest way to do the vulnerability assessment In the ACC SSG method, the risk
anarysis isnot included inone ofthe steps. For the CCPS SVA method, the contents do
include the risk analysis and more details compare to the ACC SSG. However, in CCPS
SVA, the site survey process isnot included. [1]
Hie prototype Vulnerability Assessment Model (VAM) developed for mis project is a
systematic, risk based approach in which risk is a function of the severity of
consequences ofan undesired event, the likelihood ofadversary attack, and the likelihood
of adversary success in causing the undesired event. For the purpose of the VAM
asaryses:Risk is a function of S, LA, and LAS.[3]
S- severityofconsequences ofan event.
LA=likelihood of adversary attack.
LS= likelihood ofadversary attack and severity ofconsequences ofan event.
LAS^ likelihood ofadversary success incausing a catastrophic event
The VAM compares relative security risks. If the risks are deemed unacceptable,
recommendations can be developed for measures to reduce the risks. For example, the
severity of the consequences can be lowered in several ways, such as reducing the
quantity of hazardous material present or siring chemical facilities (CFs) farther from
populated areas. Although adversary characteristics generally are outside the control of
CFs, they can take steps to make themselves a less attractive target and reduce the
likelihood ofattack to their facilities. Reducing the quantity ofhazardous material present
may also make a CF less attractive to attack. The most common approach, however, to
reducing the likelihood ofadversary success in causing acatastrophic event is increasing
protective measures against specific adversary attack scenarios. Because each undesirable
event is likely to have its own consequences, adversaries, likelihood of attack, attack
scenario, and likelihood of adversary success, it is necessary to determine the risk for
eachcombination of risk factors. [3]
CHAPTER 3
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT METHOD FRAMEWORK
3.0SCREENING FORTHE NEED FORA VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Screening chemical facilities has two purposes which are, for individual Chemical
Facilities (CFs), tiie screening determines whether or not avulnerability assessment (VA)
should be conducted and for organizations with more than one CF, the screening
determines winch CFs should undergo Vas and prioritizes them. [3]
3J DEFINING THE PROJECT
After aCF has been screened and selected for a VA, the next step is to assign afacilitator
trained in the VAM to define me VA project for that facility. Defining the project
includes reviewing the purpose of the work to be performed, the tasks to be
accomplished, and the resources to be allocated; creating a schedule of activities; and
assembling ateam to accomplish the work. The team may be the same one that prepared
the process hazards analysis (PHA) for the facility, with the addition of one or more
employees with security responsibilities. The project definition should bedocumented in
awritten statement that may be amended as the VA progresses. [3]
3.2 CHARACTERIZING THE FACILITY
An early step in security system analysis is to describe thoroughly the facility, including
the site boundary, building locations, floor plans, access points, and physical protection
features; and the processes that take place within the facility. This information can be
obtained from several sources, including design blueprints, process descriptions, the PHA
report, the RMP, the piping and instrument drawing (P&ID), and site surveys. [3]
3.2.1 The Facility Characterization Matrix
The facility characterization matrix organizes the security factors for each
processing activity and provides a framework for determining and prioritizing the
critical activities[3]
3.2.2Process FlowDiagram
A process flow diagram must be created that shows the use of each
reportable chemical that can be exploited to create an undesired event. The
diagram prepared for the PHA to determine the critical processing activities can
be med fortheVAas well.[3]
Figure 5 presents a form for recording the use and handling of chemicals
and the hazard reduction measures available at each stage in the manufacturing
process. The information recorded can then beused toanalyze the manufacturing
process to determine the critical activities
Manufacturing Steps
Incoming Staging In In Process Staging Out Outgoing













'Chemicals orother hazardous substances listed in 40CFR 68.130 or 29 CFR 1910.119.
Figure 5: Form for Analysis of Operating Activities [31
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3.2.3 Process Control Flow Diagram
A flow diagram can be developed for the process control system for each
critical activity. A generic process control flow diagram is provided in Figure 6.
Process control is normally a closed cycle in which a sensor provides information
to a process control software application through a communications system. The
application determines if the sensor information is within the predetermined (or
calculated) data parameters andconstraints. The results of this comparison are fed
to an actuator, which controlsthe critical component. [3]
This feedback may control tie component electronically or may indicate
the need for a manual action. This closed-cycle process has many checks and
balances to ensure that it stays safe. The investigation of how the process control
canbe subverted is likely to be extensive because all orpartof the process control
may be oral instructions to an individual monitoring the process. It may be fully
computer controlled and automated, or it may be a hybrid in which only the
sensor is automated and the action requires manual intervention. Further, some
process control systems may use prior generations of hardware and software,












































































3.3 DERIVING SEVERITY LEVELS
The severity ofconsequences for each undesired event must bederived. For facilities that
have conducted PHAs, the severity table created for the PHA should beconsidered first
This table may need to be modified to account for the consequences ofa malevolent
(rather than an accidental) event. Another source of data to help determine the severity of
consequences is theanalysis ofthe offsite consequences ofthe worst case and alternative-
release scenarios. (ITie results ofthese analyses may also need to be modified.) Figure 7
provides sample definitions of severity levels from 1 to 4. CFs that must submit RMPs
most likely will berated atseverity level 1. [3]
Hie sample definitions below are most usefiil to CFs that do not have to submit RMPs
but have decided to perform a VA. This table should be made site specific because
various CFs and communities may assign different severity levels to similar
consequences. Each undesired event will be assigned a severity level based on the
consequences defined by the severity level definition table. Tins severity value (S) will be




Potential for any of the following resulting from achemical release, detonation, or explosion: worker
fatalities, public fatalities, extensive property damage, facility disabled for more than 1month, major
environmental impacts, or evacuation of neighbors.
Potential for any of the following resulting fan afire or major chemical release; nonfatal injuries, unit
disabled for less than 1month, or shutdown of road or river traffic.
Potential for any of the following resulting from achemical release: unit evacuation, minor injuries, or
minor offsite impact (for example, odor).
An operational problem that does not have potential to cause injury or areportable chemical release
with no offsite impact.
Figure 7: Sample Severity Level Definitions 131
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3.4 ASSESSING THREATS
3.4.1 Describing the general threat.
A general description of the threat is required to estimate the likelihood
that adversaries might attempt an attack. This description includes the type of
adversary and the tactics and capabilities (for example, the number in the group,
weapons, equipment, and mode oftransportation) associated with each threat. [3]
3.4.2 Defining the site-specific threat.
The threat also must be defined for each specific site. The definition
includes tiie number ofadversaries, their modus operandi, the type of tools and
weapons they would use, and the type of events or acts they are willing to
commit. It is important toupdate a site's threat analysis regularly, especially when
obvious changes in threatoccur. [3]
An example of the result ofthe information collection is shown in Figure
8. This threat information is used to develop adversary scenarios and estimate the
effectiveness of theprotection system.
14

























Extremist 5-10 Signs Cars No weapons Protests
Chains Buses CM! cBsobedfence
Locks Damage
Handtools Destruction
If* 1 Onsite Cars Handguns Destruction
equipment Pickup trucks Automatics Violence
4x4 Explosives TW
Vandal 1-3 pat Cars
Pickup trucks
Hunting rifles Random shootings
Tagging
Figure 8: Sample Site-Specific Threat Descriptionf31
15
After the threat spectrum has been described, the information can be used
together with statistics of past events and site-specific perceptions of threats to
categorize threats in terms of likelihood that each would attempt an undesired
event [3]. The Department of Defense (DoD) standard definitions1 have been
modified for use incategorizing the threats against CFs, as shown inFigure 9
Definition
Threat exists, is capable, has intent or history, and has targeted the facility.
Threat exists, is capable, ties intent or history, but has not targeted the facility.
"Rtfeat edsfe arrf is cap^>le3 but has no infect or history and has not targeted the facility.
Threat exists, but is not capable of causing undesired event
Fignre 9: Definitions ofLevel ofLikelihood ofAttack (LAM31
3.5 PRIORITIZING CASES
After the severity (S) of each undesired event and the likelihood ofattack (LA) for each
adversary group have been determined, these values are ranked in amatrix (Figure 10) to
derive the LS values. If, for example, an adversary group has a level 2 likelihood of
attack for a specific undesired event and the undesired event has a severity level of3, the
likelihood and severity level (LS) would be 3. Priority cases would be those undesired
event/adversary group pairswitha likelihood and severity (LS) value closer to I manthe
value chosen by the CF. These priority cases should be analyzed further for protection
system effectiveness.[3]
16
Figure 10: Samnle Likelihood and Severity Priority Ranking Matrix [3]
3.6 PREPARING FOR SITE ANALYSIS
To prepare for the analysis to determine the effectiveness of the site protection system,
background information should be assembled. This information should include site
drawings, the PHA, physical protection system (PPS) features, and process control data.
Information worksheets have been developed to collect site information needed for the
effectiveness analysis anddocumentation.[3]
Aneffective PPS will neutralize the adversary andprevent anundesired event witha
high degree of confidence. The more effective the PPS, the less likely the adversary will
succeed. Thus LAS is derived directly from estimates of thePPS effectiveness, as shown
in tiie definition table (Figure 11). The facilitator should develop a definition table forthe
levels of likelihood of adversary success for the physical protection system that is
specific to the site.[3]
17
Ineffedi^ or no prdecBon n^aajres; ^tastro^iic event is expected.
Few^ecti^i mea^ir^; ^tastRtfifc e^nt is prcfcabie.
3 Major jffotecfion m^sures; catastrophic event is possible.
in measuRs: sun
Figure 11: Sample Definitions of Likelihood ofAdversary Success (LasH31
The final step ofpreparing for the system effectiveness analysis is to create a priority
ranking matrix that combines likelihood and severity ofattack (LS) (the matrix for which
ispresented in Figure 10) and likelihood ofadversary success (LAS) (see Figure 12). The
completed matrix willbeusedto estimate risklevels. [3]














4 •" a' 4 4 4
Figure 12: Sample Risk Priority Ranking Matrix f31
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3.7 SURVEYING THE SITE
The information, drawings, and worksheets that were assembled and completed by the
facilitator should be reviewed by the entire team for accuracy and validation in
preparation for the system effectiveness analysis that follows. Awalk-through survey of
the site should be done with special emphasis on verifying critical activities and target
information. [3]
3.8 ANALYZING THE SYSTEM'S EFFECTIVENESS
Estimating system effectiveness means judging whether the protection features of the
facility are adequate to prevent the undesired event from occurring. For each critical
activity, two or more estimates of protection system effectiveness will be made: One or
more for the physical protection system and one or more for the protection system for
process control. For the physical protection system, the first estimate measures the
system's effectiveness in preventing the undesired event. If the undesired event cannot be
prevented, another estimate measures the system's effectiveness in detecting the event
and mitigating its consequences so that the event isnot catastrophic. [3]
After tiie most vulnerable adversary strategies for each undesired event have been
established, adversary paths to the critical assets to cause that event are considered. Site
layout drawings may help summarize all possible physical paths from outside the facility















Figure 13: Possible Adversary Pathsl31
-Windows
Path 2
Hie adversary sequence diagram (ASD), which models tiie facility's physical protection
system, identifies paths that adversaries can follow to commit sabotage or theft. ASDs
help prevent overlooking possible adversary paths and help identify protection system
upgrades that affect the paths most vulnerable toadversaries. Exliibit 14 presents an ASD
for the fecility shown in Figure 13. The most vulnerable adversary path is used to

















Figure 14: Sample Facility Adversary Seauence Diaeram[3]
3.7.1 Physical Protection Features for Scenario
The features ofthe facility that support the functions of detection, delay,
response, and mitigation and any safety features that could affect the outcome of
the adversary scenario should be noted. Tliese features can be identified from the
facility worksheets used to determine the system's effectiveness, the
characterization matrix, and facility personnel's knowledge of such features. [3]
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locks
Response Features
* Local law enforcement







Figure 15: Sample Scenario and Protection System Features[3|
3.7.2 Protection for Process Control Scenario
The features ofthe process control protection system that could affect the
outcome of the adversary scenario should be noted. As with the physical
protection system, these features can be identified from facility worksheets used
to evaluate die system's effectiveness, the characterization matrix, and facility
personnel's knowledge of the features. The system must protect the process
control features mentioned in the section on preparing the site analysis:
communications, commercial hardware and software, application software, and
parameter data or support infrastructure (for example, power and HVAC)[3],
Figure 16 proposes aprocess control adversary scenario and lists process control










































Figure 16: Sample Process Control Protection Featiires[3]
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3.9 ANALYZING RISKS
Abriefreview ofthe methodology is presented below in preparation for risk analysis.
Forthepurposes ofthis methodology.
Risk is a function of S, LA, andLAS.
S= severity of consequences ofan event
LA^ likelihood of adversary attack
LS= likehhood ofadversary attack and severity ofconsequences ofan event
LAS= likelihood ofadversary success incausing a catastrophic event
Priority cases for an undesired event or adversary group were determined by estimating
the likelihood and severity level (LS) using the priority ranking matrix for likelihood of
attack (LA) and severity (S) (see Figure 10). LS levels are combined with LAS levels to
estimate the level of risk for each imdesired event/adversary group (see Figure 12).
Figure 17 is a flowchart for the process, and Figure 18 summarizes the results of the risk
analysis.p}





















Figure 18: Risk Level Summary13]
3.10 MAKINGRECOMMENDATIONS FOR RISK REDUCTION
Ifthe risk level is 1,2, or 3, detection, delay, response, and mitigation/safety features that
eliminate or mitigate the specific identified vulnerabilities should be suggested. The goal
is low-cost, high-return upgrades. [3]
3.11 PREPARING THE FINAL REPORT
The final report and package for briefing management can be prepared from the
worksheets when completing theanalysis. [3]
24
CHAPTER 4
RESULTS (CASE STUDY) AND DISCUSSION
Vinyl Chloride (Malaysia) SDN BHD
MTKMUt




Assistant: Esa Bin Diman
4.0 SCREENING FOR THE NEED OF VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (VA)
The screening process is based primarily on the possible consequences of potential
terrorist incidents atchemical facilities. In order to fulfill the screening processes, several
information are needed such as the desired event, the impact on die nation, and the
facility tools. For the desired event, an offsite release was considered. If the lose of the
facility have a significant impact onthenation, theVA information need tobeclassified.
If the facility has a tool onsite inventory of threshold quantities (TQ) or greater of
chemical covered under Federal regulation 40 CFR 68.130, further screening is needed to
estimate the number ofpeople that would be affected under the worst-case-scenario.[3]
For the case study, the Vinyl Chloride Malaysia Sdn Bhd (VCMSB) was selected to be
undergoing the vulnerability assessment due to the feasibility on collecting data.
4.1 DEFINING THE VCMSB PROJECT








Vinyl Chloride Malaysia Sdn Bhd (VCMSB)
Technical and Services Departmen Executive Engineer, EsaBin Diman
Terrorist attack has a significant impact on the nation especially inthe
tourism industries. According toDepartment ofForeign Affairs and
Trade (Australia)^Several cautionshave been issued for touristwho
chose Malaysia astheir holiday location due to the high risk ofterrorist










C2H4 +2HC1 + 1/202 --> C2H4C12 (EDC) +H20
EDC Cracker Process
C2H4C12 -->C2H3C1 (VCM) + HCl
lmolbasis of oxygen = 7135 kg/hr
C2H4 (Ethylene) - 7135 kg/hr
2HCl(Hydrochloric Acid) =7135 x 2= 14270 kg/hr
C2H4C12(EDC) = 7135 kg/hr
C2H3Ci(VCM) =7135kg/hr
7135 kg/hr = 15729.98 Ibs/hr
14270 kg/hr = 31459.93 lbs/hr
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4.1.2 Threshold Quantities (TO^ in Federal Regulation 40 CFR 68.130
Ethylene -10000 lbs
Hydrochloric Acid = 15000 lbs
EDC =10000 lbs
VCM = 10000 lbs
*Oxygen is not stated in the Federal Regulation
All chemicals that are using in the VCMSB plant to produce Vinyl Chloride Monomer
hasagreater TQ inFederal Regulation 40 CFR 68.130
4.2 CHARACTERIZING THE VCMSB
An early step in asecurity system analysis is to describe thoroughly the facility, including
the site boundary, building location, floor plans, access points, physical protection
features andprocess involve. [3]
4.2.1 VCMSB Process Flow Diagram
A process flow diagram must be created to show the use of each
reportable chemical that can be exploited to create an undesired event. The
diagram prepared for the PHA to determine the critical processing activities can
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5. ISBL PROCESS FLOW AND DESCRIPTION
5.1. ISBL PROCESS FLOW
101 impoctKieoc






























varaoantcSale rf p*»o. TWs manual h inet-ttiKtu* jreoerty«vtcMjsaana»ti nwteecSKiinutiofc a?
P^nortaf^W!W»anflWWpi^/<ift5rt>wll^cewnMMtfGfAttOrt
Figure 4.2 (a) : VCMSB Process Flow Diagram F6I
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4.2.2 Process Control Flow Diagram
Aprocess flow diagram can be developed for the process control system
ibr each critical activity. Process control is nonnally a closed cycle in which a
sensor provides information to a process control software application through a
communications system. The application determines if the sensor information is
within the predetermined (or calculated) data parameters and constraints. The
results of this comparison are fed to an actuator, which controls the critical















Figure 4.2 (h): Example of Process Control in VCMSB P&ID f61
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This feedback may control the component electronically ormay indicate
the need for amanual action. This closed-cycle process has many checks and
balances to ensure that it stays safe. The investigation ofhow the process control
can be subverted islikely to be extensive because all orpart ofthe process control
may be oral instructions to an individual monitoring the process. Itmay be fully
computer controlled and automated, oritmay beahybrid inwhich only the
sensor isautomated and the action requires manual intervention. Further, some
process control systems may use prior generations ofhardware and software,






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3 DERIVING SEVERITY LEVELS
Theseverity of consequences foreach undesired event mustbe derived. Each undesired
event will be assigned aseverity level based on the consequences defined by the severity
level definition table asin Table 4.3 (a).
Table 43 (a\: Activity 2 (Feed Inlet to Process^ Severity Level
J3L •tfeMon
Potential for anyofthe following resulting from a chemical release, detonation or
explosion, worker fatalities, public fatalities, extensive property damage facilities
disable for more than 1 month, major environment impacts orevacuation of
neighbors
Potential foranyofthefollowing resulting from a fire or major chemical release,
non fata! injuries, unitdisable for less than 1 month, or shutdown of road or river
traffic
Potential for anyofthe following resulting from a chemical release, unit
evacuation, minor injuries, or minoroffsite impact (Odor)
An operational problem that does not have potential to cause injury ora reportable
chemical release with no offsite impact
Severity (S)-l
Jable 4.3 (b): Severity level for all activities
Activity (S) Information
Feed Inlet tothe process (Unit 1200)
i1 i
1 Feed inlet to the reactor R-1201 do involve mixer
M-1201 with high pressure 3.5b. The oxygen is
mix with ethylene and hydrochloric acid before
entered the reactor. The mixerdo have potential
risks involving chemical release, detonation, and
etc.
C^^winalKMtjffEfee^{Unit 1200) 1 The reactor used foroxychlorination is fiuidized
bed reactor R-1201. OxychIorination process is
very exothermic. Major chemical released will
occur when undesired event occur.
£DC,purif|catibri (Unit 1300) 2 EDC will be purified in the column C-
1401A/B/C/D.EDC is very dangerous and
carcinogen. EDC release will not do a fatal injury
to the worker
EDCcrackin§r(Unit 1400) 2 EDC will be cracked in the furnace E-
1405A/B/C/D in 450C. The furnace cracker
failure will involve a major fire released.
V^purification (Unit 1500) { 2 VCM will be purified in the column C-
1501A/B/C/D. VCM is very hazardous and




The threat also must be defined for each specific site. The definition
includes the number of adversaries, their modus operandi, the type of tools and
weapons they would use, and the type of events or acts they are willing to
commit. It is important toupdate a site's threat analysis regularly, especially when
obvious changes in threat occur. Tins threat infonnation is used to develop
adversary scenarios and estimate the effectiveness ofthe protection system.
Table 4.4(a): Threat Description
Type of Adversary Number Equipment Vehicle Weapon Tactic
Vandal 1-3 Paint Cars, Hunting Random
Motorcycle rifles shootings,
Tagging
Insider 1 Onsite Cars, Pickup Handguns, Destruction,
equipment trucks Explosives Violence,
Theft




Criminal 2-3 Hand tools, Foot, Truck, Handguns, Extortion,
Body armor Aircraft Explosive Theft
Outsider Terrorist 2-3 Hand tools, All terrain Handguns, Catastrophic





After the threat spectrum has been described, the information is used
together with statistics of past events and site-specific perceptions of threats to
categorize threats in terms of likelihood that each would attempt an undesired
event
Table 4.4 (h): Likelihood of Attack for Activity 2 (Feed inlet to process^
1JAL Definition
Threat exist,is capable.has intentor history.and has targeted the facility
Threatexist,is capable.has intentor history.and but not targeted the facility
Threat existand capable, buthas no intent or history and nottargeted the facility
Threat exist but not capable of causing undesired event
L(A) = 3
T^Me 44fek Likelihood ofAttack for all activities
Activity
Feed inletto the process (Unit 1200)
Oxyetilorination process (Unit 1200)
EDCpurification (Unit 1300)
EDC cracking (Unit 1400)
VCM purification (Unit 1500)
UAl Information
Threats exist in Unit 1200 and capable of being
attack. There are no history recorded in VCMSB
and the unit is not yet targeted
Threats exist in Unit1200 and capable of being
attack. There are no history recorded in VCMSS
and the unit is not yet targeted
Threats exist in Unit 1300 and capable of being
attack. There are no history recorded in VCMSB
and the unit is not yet targeted
Threats exist in Unit 1400 and capable of being
attack. There are no history recorded in VCMSB
and the unit is not yet targeted
Threats exist in Unit 1500 and capable of being
attack. There are no history recorded in VCMSB
andthe unit is not yettargeted
4.5 PRIORITIZING CASES
After the severity (S) ofeach undesired event and the likelihood of attack (LA) for each
adversary group have been determined, these values are ranked in a matrix (Table 4.5 a)
toderive the LS values. If, for example, an adversary group has a level 2 likelihood of
attack for a specific imdesired event and the undesired event has a severity level of3,the
likelihood and severity level (LS) would be 3. Priority cases would be those undesired
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event/adversary group pairs with a likehhood and severity (LS) value closer to 1than the
value chosen by the CF. These priority cases should be analyzed further for protection
system effectiveness
Table 4.5 (a): Matrix of Severity(S)and Likelihood ofAttack. L(A)for Activity 2
US) Severity of Consequence (S)
Ltkefahood of Attack L (A)
2 3 4









Table 4.5 fb): The likelihood and severity level for all activities
Activity L(S)
Feed inletto the process (Unit 1200) 2
Oxychlorination process (Unit 1200) 2
ESCpurification (Unit 1300) 3
EDCcracking (Unit 1400)
VCM purification (Unit 1500) 3
4.6 VCMSB SITE ANALYSIS
To prepare for the analysis to determine the effectiveness of the site protection system,
background information should be assembled. This infonnation should include site
drawings, the PHA, physical protection system (PPS) features, and process control data.
Information worksheets have been developed to collect site information needed for the
effectiveness analysis and documentation. An effective PPS will neutralize the adversary
andprevent an imdesired event with a high degree of confidence. The more effective the
PPS, the less likely the adversary will succeed. Thus LAS is derived directly from
estimates of the PPS effectiveness, as shown in the definition table (Table 4.6a). The
facilitator should develop a definition table for the levels of likelihood of adversary
success forthephysical protection system that is specific tothesite
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Table 4.6 (a): Likelihood of Adversary Success. L (AS) for Activity 2
l (AS) Definition
Ineffective and noprotection measures, catastrophic event is expected
Few protection measures, catastrophic event is probable
Major protection measures, catastrophic event is possible
Complete protection measures, catastrophic eventis prevented
L(AS) = 4
Table 4.6 (h): Likelihood of Adversary Success. L (AS) for all activities
Activity
Feed inlet to the process (Unit 1200)
Oxychlorination process(Unit 1200)
£DC purification (Unit 1300)
EDC cracking (Unit 1400)
VCM purification (Unit 1500)
L(AS) Information
The mixer M-1201 is covered with thick concrete
Reactor R-1201 is widely open to the
atmosphere. Thereare possibility ofcausing the
catastrophic events
Column C-1301A/B/C/D are widely open to the
atmosphere. There are probability of causing #*e
catastrophic events
Furnace cracker E-1405A/B/C/D are build with a
high temperature resistant steel. There are
possibility of causing the catastrophic events
Column C-1501 A/B/C/D are widely open to the
atmosphere. There are probability of causing the
catastrophic events
The final step ofpreparing for the system effectiveness analysis is to create a priority
ranking matrix that combines likelihood and severity of attack (LS) and likelihood of
adversary success (LAS) The completed matrix will beused to estimate risk levels.
Table 4.6.1 fa): Matrix of Likehhood and Severity of Attack L (S land Likelihoodof
Adversary Success L (AS) for Activity 2
Risk Likelihood of Adversary S uccess L (AS)
Likelihood and Seventy of Attack L(S;
1
1 2 3 MMi
1 1 2 4
1 2 3 4
2 3 4
*
3 4 4 4 I
Risk = 4
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Table 4.6.1 (b): Risk for aU activities
RiskAclivil\
Feed inlet to the process (Unit 1200)
Oxychlonnation process (Unit 1200)
EDC punfication (Unit 1300)
EDC cracking {Unix 1400)
VCM pTirTflca"tio7r(Uniri500)
4.7 VCMSB SITE SURVEY
Hie information, drawings, and worksheets that were assembled and completed by the
facilitator should be reviewed by the entire team for accuracy and validation in
preparation for the system effeaiveness analysis that follows. Awalk-through survey of
the site should be done with special emphasis on verifying critical activities and target
information
4.8 ANALYZING THE SYSTEM'S EFFECTIVENESS
Estimating system effectiveness means judging whether the protection features of the
fecility are adequate to prevent the undesired event from occurring. For each critical
activity, two or more estimates of protection system effectiveness will be made: One or
more for the physical protection system and one or more for the protection system for
process control. For the physical protection system, the first estimate measures the
system's effectiveness in preventing the imdesired event. If theundesired event cannot be
prevented, another estimate measures the system's effectiveness in detecting the event
and mitigating itsconsequences so that the event isnot catastrophic.
After the most vulnerable adversary strategies for each undesired event have been
established, adversary paths to the critical assets to cause that event are considered. Site
layout drawings may help summarize all possible physical paths from outside the facility

























Figure 4.8 (a): Possible Adversary Paths 16f
The adversary sequence diagram (ASD), which models the facility's physical protection
system, identifies paths that adversaries can follow to commit sabotage or theft. ASDs
help prevent overlooking possible adversary paths and help identify protection system
upgrades that affect the paths most vulnerable to adversaries. Figure 4.8 (a) and (b)
present ASD for the facility. The most vulnerable adversary path is used to measure the

















Fifiure 4.8 tb): Facility Adversary Seauence Diaeram
4.8.1 Physical Protection Features for Scenario
The features ofthe facility that support the fimctions ofdetection, delay,
response, andmitigation and any safety features that could affect die outcome of
the adversary scenario should benoted. These features can be identified from the
facility worksheets used to determine the system's effectiveness, the
characterization matrix, and facility personnel's knowledge of such features.

























Figure 4.8 (c\: Scenario and Protection System Featuresf31
4.8.2 Protection for Process Control Scenario
The features of the process control protection system that could affect the
outcome of the adversary scenario should be noted. As with the physical
protection system, these features can be identified from facihty worksheets used
to evaluate the system's effectiveness, the characterization matrix, and fecility
personnel's knowledge of the features. The system must protect the process
control features mentioned in the section on preparing the site analysis:
communications, commercial hardware and software, application software, and
parameter data orsupport infrastructure. Figure 4.8 (d) proposes a process control









































unusual use written privilege
Figure 4.8 ftD: Process Control Protection Featuresf31
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The information above will be used to determine the Severity (S), Likelihood of
Adversary Attack L (A), Likelihoodof Adversary Attack and Severity L (S), Likelihood
of Adversary Success L (AS)and the risk.
table 4.8 (e): Summary ofthe Process Control VA
(S) L(A) L(S) L(AS) Risk
Activity 2 2 1 1 2 1
Activity 3 3 1 2 2 2
Activity4 1 4 3 3 4
Activity 5 2 3 3 4 4
Activity 6 2 2 2 1 1
4.9 ANALYZING RISKS
Abriefreview of themethodology is presented below in preparation forriskanalysis.
Priority cases for an undesired event or adversary group were detennined by estimating
the likelihood and severity level (LS) using the priority ranking matrix for likelihood of
attack (LA) and severity (S) LS levels are combined with LAS levels to estimate the level


































Activity 2 Terrorist Attack 2 4 4 2 1
Activity 3 Terrorist Attack 2 2 3 2 2
Activity 4 Ttsrrorist Attack 3 2 3 3 4
Activity 5 Ti3rrorist Attack 3 3 4 4 4
Activity 6 TRrrorist Attack 3 2 3 1 1
From table 4.9 (a), activity 3,4 and 6 have aphysical risk level of3while for the process
control risk, activity 2, 3 and 6 do have a risk level lower than 4. If the risk level is 1, 2,
or 3, a few recommendations will be suggested. After recommendations are made, the
new system effectiveness level and risk level should beestimated. The process continues
until acceptablerisk levels4 are achieved
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4.10 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RISK REDUCTION [3]
1. Physical protection unprovements (detection, delay, and response improvements); for
example:
• Sensors on gates and doors.
• An assessment system (cameras).
• A security alarm control center.
• Hardened doors and locks.
• Access control (cards + PIN) ondoors andgates.
• A compartmentalized facility.
2. Consequence reduction improvements (detection, mitigation improvements); for
example:
• Reduction ofquantity ofcontrolled chemicals (to less than TQ).
• Dispersion of chemicals (in storage).
• Addition ofmitigation measures conceived or known by facility personnel.
3,Process control protection improvements; for example:
• Chemical/process sensors routedto alarm control center.
• Protected and strong passwords that are changed regularly.
• Firewalls.
» Configuration control (ofsecurity patches/routing table/control parameters).
• Virusprotection.
• Computerauditsofactivity on network.
• Encryption and authentication.
• Emergency backups/backup power.
• Redundant communication.





Basically, all the VA methods (Vulnerability Assessment Methodology (VAM),
American Chemical Council (ACC) and Chemical Engineers Center for Chemical
Process Safety (CCPS)) can be applied within the PETRONAS. Due to the procedure
completeness, the VAM is chose to be used in the case study in Vinyl Chloride Malaysia
Sdn Bhd (VCMSB). There are twelve basic steps in the VAM, starting from the screening
for tiie purpose ofthe VA until the final report. In order to fulfill the VAM, real databases
from VCMSB are needed. However, due to copyright issue, certain data are unable to
collect, hence affecting the result. Some dummy value was used to continue the case
study. From the results, we can see that there are three activities in VCMSB plant that are
need tobe focus on due to its high risk. The three activities are feed inlet to the process,
oxychlorination process and VCM purification. The risk is reducing by introducing the
recommendation.
5.1 RECOMMENDATION
Due to time constraint and copyright issues, the VAM are not fully success. Actual data
from plant and further research on the VAM need to be done in order to enhance the




1. Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for Electric Power Infrastructure by U.S
Department of Energy Office of Energy Assurance
(httu://www.esisac.com/pubhcdocs/assessmentjnetfaodsArA.pdi)
2. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(httD://www.csc.noaa.gov/vata/glossarv.htmn
3. Amethod to Assess the Vulnerability ofU.S Chemical Facilities by U.S Department of
Justice; (http://www.ncirs.gov/pdffilesl/nii/l95l71.pdf)
4. Amo Mosaic Corporation Whitepaper By :R. Peter Stickles, Henry Ozog and Sanjeev
Mohindra (lutp;/7aicliivesl.ioniosaic.coiii/whiteDapeis/SVA.DdO
5. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/npgsvn-a.htmn
6. Vinyl Chloride Malaysia Sdn Bhd (VCMSB) Operation Manual and Data Sheets
7. 40CFR 68.130 - List of substances.( http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/68-130-list-substances-
19S01315)
8. Smart Traveler, Australian Government Department ofForeign Affairs and Trade
(http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/Malavsiat
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EDC and VCM Purification Unit
EDC Cracker
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Environmental Protection Agency §68.130
Table 3to §68.130—List of Reguuted Flammable Substances1 and Threshold Quantities







Carbon oxysulflde [Carbon oxide surfide (COS)].










Eftji acetyfefie [1-B.tyw] „...„...„.„.„,..„.„
Ethylamlne fEthanamineJ
Ethyl chloride [Ethane, chloro-]
Ethylene [Ethene]
Ethyl ether [Ethane, IJ'-oxyWs-] „..






Isopropyi chloride [Propane, £chtoro-]
MethylamtneEMethanamlne]
2-MethyH-butene
Methyl ether [Methane, oxybis-]







































Federal Regulation 40 CFR 68.130
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